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1 Images which overexpose violence are currently in the eye of a stormy quarrel. What is
the right distance for looking at, dwelling on, and observing horror? And what happens to
aesthetics and beauty when the unimaginable is put on display? What is presented by the
clash between authentic testimony and artistic intervention?
2 In 1853, Hegel’s student, Karl Rosenkranz, wrote an Aesthetics of Ugliness. In the preface to
the French edition, the idea of theorizing over what the author calls in his introduction
“aesthetic inferno” is turn by turn described as a “semblance of the phenomenology of
ugliness” (p.11)  and a “metaphysics  of  beauty” (p.14).  What  is  in fact  involved is  an
aesthetic  inferno  to  which  the  philosopher  unfailingly  succumbs.  And  this  for  two
reasons:  because  he  does  not  manage–and  for  good  cause–to  dominate  the  initial
challenge, which is to distinguish evil from ugliness. And because he uses the concept of
ugliness rather to make a hypostasis of beauty, an ideal which an aesthetics of reception
strove to rid itself  of  in the 19th century.  As the first  project  trying to establish an
autonomous theory of ugliness, the late-in-the-day publication of the French translation
is only to be lamented. A descriptive zeal and overly heterogeneous examples are often
held against  the  author.  Rosenkranz’s  book,  coming  after  Lessing  and  Herder  in
particular,  nevertheless  broaches  an  issue  which,  for  some  decades  now,  has  been
gathering sway. Involved here are the boundaries of the (re)presentable, and of ugliness
authorized (by whom?) in art.  The 18th century pointed to the degree beyond which
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ugliness became intolerable: disgust, and distaste. In his preface, Gérard Raulet accuses
Rosenkranz of sidestepping pathos–a factor which makes it possible to proceed from a
rhetorical system to an aesthetic one–in order to turn it into pathology. So, today, what
has become of the link to the image of “flawed beauty”?
3 Between testimony and document, and aesthetic attention and intention, J. Galard’s La
Beauté à outrance [Outrageous Beauty] sets forth and questions the shots we make of our
present-day  brutality–and  the  way  we  look  at  it.  Is  this  aversion,  or  caricature  of
violence? Rosenkranz alloted two limits to ugliness: beauty and comedy. Today, it is a
matter of being able to demonstrate the ethical and aesthetic distance between viewer
and  image  and  image  and  viewer.  There  is  also  cause  to  wonder  whether  images
themselves determine this “gap”. The status of photography and live reportage poses
problems which La Beauté à outrance subtly develops. So the following acknowledgement
rears its head: instead of introducing proof of the veracity of their testimony, images
taken on the spot, in the flesh, leave “impressions”. They are not individualized, they do
not even teach us things we do not know about, they are quite simply “interesting”. This,
says Galard, is one of the reasons why they come back to us “like a loop”. The semblance
of authenticity is appropriate. So is the mass effect. Neither pathos nor pathology, but an
effect  of  saturation,  a  documentary presentation claiming to  display both the  object
aimed at and its own shooting mechanisms. Aesthetic excess clouds reality, it creates a
“retraction” or “spiriting away”(Wegkünsteln), to borrow Rosenkranz’s term. What is the
degree of this excess and what is the norm in force for the aesthetic link? Doing away
with pleasant connotations and wondering if the aesthetic link offers active access to an
understanding of reality or if it removes the sense of reality from everything to the point
of anaesthesia is what Galard proposes (p.34). Is it minimum artistic intervention which,
alone, guarantees the authenticity of testimony, as put forward by Susan Sontag in Devant
la douleur des autres [Regarding the Pain of Others]? Or alternatively, is it only an artistic
work pushed to the limit, “aimed at lucidity and aptness” (Galard, p.152), as envisaged by
K. Fielder, that is capable of achieving clarity? Fielder’s word reverberates in Galard’s
book, even if there is no reference to it therein.
4 Fiedler (1841-1895) attributes the active access to an understanding of reality to a labour
of  construction,  and  production.  This  task  is  accomplished  by  artistic  activity.  The
Aphorisms strive, in a neo-Kantian vein, whose ins and outs are laid out with both skill and
subtlety by Danièle Cohn’s preface, to challenge once more a certain number of accepted
ideas, fashioned by an aesthetic tradition torn between two stools: «Either imitation of
nature or painting of ideas, this is the rub; aptness is elsewhere and will be obtained by
those who find a third way [...]» (§150). Aptness does not consist in denying aesthetic
pleasure,  but  in  not  subordinating  art  to  beauty;  it  does  not  deny  the  existence  of
aesthetic sentiments, but avoids muddling them with what is crucial to a comprehension
of art. Instead of starting out from a theory of reception, from a conception of painting as
imitation giving rise to “ghosts of passions” (Abbé Du Bos), Fiedler sees art as a human
need, the setting in motion and development of an activity, and an acquisition by the
artist of an intuitive knowledge, a shift “from visual perception to visible expression”1.
Starting from the artist’s work and an attention paid to the very genesis of artworks,
Fiedler attempts to formulate a line of  thinking which,  without creating any system,
tends to relieve visual art of the weight of beauty and fiercely erects an understanding of
works,  which is  possible  «when the figurative  writing of  art  communicates  a  limpid
reflection and knowledge to us [...]» (§27). The aesthetic dimension is there, but it appears
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as secondary in relation to the cognitive work which only the artist is capable of bringing
full circle. The art critic can merely try to follow the artist in his approach. No longer
thinking of the world as something given, but seeing in it a reality manufactured by an
active  approach  involving  the  production  of  the  “visible”,  this  factor  of  Fiedlerian
thinking also applies to the present-day over-use of live, in the flesh reportage.
NOTES
1. Fiedler,  Konrad.  Sur  l’origine  de  l’activité  artistique,  Paris  :  Ed.  Rue d’Ulm/Presses  de l’Ecole
normale supérieure, 2003, (Aesthetica), p.86
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